Penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana: Evidencia empírica en humanos
Cognitive penetrability in early visual perception: Empirical evidence in humans
Contenido principal del artículo
Con base en un trasfondo teórico sobre las concepciones modulares de la mente de Fodor (2001) y Pinker (2005), el objetivo del presente texto es analizar cualitativemente la solidez de la evidencia experimental de una muestra de artículos publicados entre 2002 y 2017 que apoyan la tesis de la penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana. El estudio se justifica por las implicaciones que pueden tener los resultados de estas investigaciones para las diferentes concepciones sobre arquitectura mental en funciones perceptuales, procesamiento de la información intra e intermodular e isomorfismo entre arquitectura mental y cerebral. La metodología que se utilizó para realizar este estudio implicó establecimiento de la tesis y de los criterios de inclusión de los artículos a revisar, selección final de los artículos más representativos sobre las subáreas seleccionadas, análisis de la calidad metodológica y de los resultados de éstos, identificación de aportes específicos de cada estudio a la tesis planteada e interpretación y síntesis de los hallazgos. De 26 artículos revisados sobre el tema, se reportan y analizan 7, que se consideran representativos de 4 subáreas: penetrabilidad de expectativas, de percepción del color, de rasgos faciales y de reconocimiento de objetos. Se concluye que hay amplia y sólida evidencia convergente (perceptual y neurofisiológica) a favor de los fenómenos penetrativos en la visión temprana, lo cual apoyaría indirectamente la hipótesis de permeabilidad de los módulos mentales de Pinker. Se formulan recomendaciones sobre aspectos por investigar y variables a controlar en experimentos sobre este tema.
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- Sociedad académica
- Bogotá: Corporación Universitaria Iberoamericana
- Editorial
- Bogotá: Corporación Universitaria Iberoamericana
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